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Early on the morning of 1 February 2021, Myanmar’s military (the Tatmadaw)
detained President Win Myint, the State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, and
other high-ranking government officials. The Tatmadaw declared that Tatmadaw-
nominated First Vice-President Myint Swe was Acting President under article 73a of
Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution. Myint Swe then declared a state of emergency for one
year, and transferred legislative, executive and judicial powers to the Commander-in-
Chief, Min Aung Hlaing.
The multilateral response should focus on the constitutionality of the Tatmadaw’s
actions. Myanmar’s state of emergency is a military coup d’état, and is flagrantly
unconstitutional. The international community should support Myanmar’s
democratically elected government by insisting that the constitution be followed, and
civilian authority restored immediately.
The two of us have worked in over a dozen countries across the world, for over two
decades, on constitutional reform. What we see in Myanmar deeply alarms us.
Myanmar’s state of emergency is unconstitutional
Myint Swe declared a state of emergency under article 417, which authorizes the
President to do so after consulting the National Defense and Security Council
(NDSC). Such a declaration is permitted only if there is a threat to the ‘disintegration
of the Union or national solidarity or the loss of national sovereignty’ due ‘to acts
or attempts to take over the sovereignty of the Union by insurgency, violence and
wrongful forcible means’.
The pretext for the state of emergency was the alleged failure of the Union Election
Commission to ensure free, fair, and transparent elections on 8 November 2020.
The National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory. The Tatmadaw
and its allied political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)
claim that the election was marred by fraud. They have also faulted the Speaker for
rejecting their proposal to hold a special session of Parliament to discuss allegations
of electoral fraud.
This argument is legally incoherent and unconvincing. The military has not
provided concrete evidence of electoral fraud despite its repeated public claims
and objections. If there were evidence of fraud, it is highly doubtful that such fraud
amounted to a loss of sovereignty. If anything it is the Tatmadaw’s refusal to respect
election results that amounts to a loss of sovereignty, as the votes of the people,
who bear sovereign power under article 4, were not respected and given effect to.
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Moreover, the nature of the electoral fraud alleged does not constitute ‘wrongful
forcible means’, because it did not entail the use of force – an interpretation of
‘forcible means’ supported by the other enumerated methods for attempting to take
over sovereignty in article 417, ‘insurgency’ and ‘violence’.
In addition, the Tatmadaw has taken power unconstitutionally because the procedure
for declaring the state of emergency was breached.
First, under article 417, only the President has the authority to declare a state
of emergency. The Tatmadaw has argued that its detention of the President led
to the office of the President falling vacant. However, this argument is legally
questionable. It is implausible that the detention of the President means that the
office of the President has fallen vacant. Article 73a refers to a vacancy due to
‘resignation, death, permanent disability or any other cause’. ‘Any other cause’
should be interpreted to exclude the illegal removal of the President. The President
was detained without any legal basis. He has reportedly refused to sign a resignation
letter.
On 3 February 2021, criminal charges were brought against the President for
breaching campaign guidelines and COVID-19 restrictions under the Natural
Disaster Management Law. The Tatmadaw might argue these charges have made
the Presidency vacant. However, they cannot, since they were filed on 3 February
2021, two days after article 73a was triggered and the declaration of the state of
emergency. Moreover, article 73a should be interpreted in accordance with article
71a, which sets out the grounds for impeaching the President that could lead to his
removal under article 71g. The Union Parliament is the only institution competent to
initiate the impeachment procedure (article 71b) and ultimately decide whether the
charges are substantiated (articles 71f and 71g). The Union Parliament was never
convened nor consulted in any of the processes undertaken.
Second, article 417 provides that the President can only declare a state of
emergency after coordinating with the National Defence and Security Council. The
NDSC is composed of 11 members, including 6 military and military-nominated
officials and 5 civilian authorities (article 201). Although Myint Swe convened a
meeting of the NDSC on 1 February 2021, only military members of the NDSC
attended the meeting. Some of the civilian members had been already been
detained. The fact that not all the members of the NDSC attended the consultative
meeting makes the state of emergency unconstitutional.
Third, after declaring a state of emergency under article 417, the President must
inform the Union Parliament (article 421a). If the Union Parliament is not in regular
session, the President must summon an emergency session (article 421a). Acting
President Myint Swe did not make any such efforts.
The Tatmadaw may argue that there was no Union Parliament in place on 1
February 2021, the day the state of emergency was declared. On 1 February 2021,
the new Union Parliament elected during the 8 November 2020 elections had not
yet commenced its term. Moreover, on 31 January, the term of the Union Parliament
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elected in the 8 November 2015 elections had just been completed (it ran for 5 years
from the day of its first session, 1 February 2016, until 31 January 2021).
The Tatmadaw struck on 1 February 2021 deliberately to fall in between the
terms of the 2016 and 2021 Union Parliaments. However, article 421a requires
the President to inform the Union Parliament. Not doing so renders the state of
emergency unconstitutional. Moreover, article 421a impliedly requires that the
new Union Parliament be brought into session, and its term commenced, and for
Myint Swe to inform it of his declaration under article 417 (assuming that Myint
Swe is Acting President, and that the NDSC was appropriately consulted). Since
the effect of a declaration of a state of emergency under article 417 is to vest all
legislative, executive, and judicial power in the Commander-in-Chief, and to suspend
the legislative powers of the Union Parliament, dispensing with article 421a would
subvert this scheme. Such an interpretation of the Constitution would be absurd.
What should the international community do?
The international community should take the following steps.
1. Affirm the validity of the 2008 Constitution
From a legal perspective, the 2008 Constitution remains in force. As a political
matter, there are strategic reasons to affirm the validity of the 2008 Constitution,
because it provides a set of institutions, procedures, and substantive norms for the
exercise of public power in Myanmar. While it is in place, political conflict can be
channeled, at least to an extent, into institutions and peaceful contestation, with
benchmarks to assess and criticize exercises of public power. By contrast, if the
2008 Constitution is set aside, political conflict will solely be a matter of raw power
politics, settled by force.
Thus far, the Tatmadaw has asserted that it is acting under the 2008 Constitution,
and there has accordingly been no rupture in constitutional legality, in order
to legitimize the state of emergency. But this may change, so the international
community must act quickly to affirm the 2008 Constitution remains in place.
Adhering to the 2008 Constitution constrains the power of the military and the
Commander-in-Chief. Since the declaration of the state of emergency itself has
breached multiple constitutional requirements, treating the 2008 Constitution as valid
and in operation provides the legal basis for demonstrating that the Commander-in-
Chief and the forces he controls are acting extra-constitutionally, despite repeated
claims to the contrary – which in turn is a source of political leverage. The 2008
Constitution also provides constitutional limits on the length of the emergency to
12 months, with two extensions of six months, or 24 months in total (article 425).
Operating under the 2008 Constitution allows other public officials and institutions to
attempt to wield constitutional powers and challenge the military.
Insisting on compliance with the 2008 Constitution also permits the international
community to hold Myanmar to account in terms of its own constitutional
commitments. The fact that it was the Tatmadaw, through its governing structures
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that prepared and led the enactment of the 2008 Constitution, is a powerful response
to any criticism of outside interference.
Moreover, the ASEAN Charter supports such an approach, which may also be
helpful in engaging diplomatically with ASEAN Member States. Article 2(2)(h) of
the ASEAN Charter provides that Member States shall act in accordance with the
principle of ‘adherence to the rule of law, good governance, and the principles of
constitutional government’. This language provides a basis for regional diplomacy to
advocate for the ongoing validity of, and adherence to, the 2008 Constitution.
2. Declare the state of emergency unconstitutional under the 2008 Constitution
Based on the legal arguments outlined above, the international community should
state unequivocally that the state of emergency is unconstitutional, on the grounds
set out above.
3. Support the exercise of constitutional powers by institutions to counter the
Tatmadaw and mobilize political support
One way to counter the Commander-in-Chief would be for other institutions to check
his authority by exercising their own powers under the 2008 Constitution. These
actions would seek to undo the state of emergency. This would serve two principal
purposes. First, they would mobilize public support against the state of emergency
and build support for the Union Parliament. Second, by taking the Tatmadaw’s
asserted fidelity to the 2008 Constitution at face value, these actions would reinforce
that the 2008 Constitution provides Myanmar’s governing framework, make it more
politically costly for the Commander-in-Chief to act unconstitutionally, and increase
the political leverage of forces seeking to end the state of emergency.
The international community should provide diplomatic support of various kinds to
these actions, by quietly encouraging these steps to be taken, and then to publicly
recognize them as official acts of government institutions.
The major contender for popular legitimacy is the recently elected Union Parliament.
On 5 February 2021, the NLD announced the formation of the Committee
Representing the Union Parliament, with 289 elected Members of Parliament (MPs)
from the 2020 elections. However, constitutionally, this announcement was not the
first session of the Union Parliament since article 85a of the Constitution requires the
attendance of more than half of the total number of MPs (321) for the session to be
valid.
The elected MPs should convene online the first session of the lower house (Pyithu
Hluttaw) with more than half of the total number of members of that chamber
(213), in accordance with article 128a. Such a session would start the term of both
chambers of the Union Parliament (articles 119 and 154a). The next step would be
to engage the procedure in article 75 to convene the Union Parliament, to administer
the oath of affirmation, and to elect the Speaker and Deputy Speaker. The Union
Parliament should then move immediately into a debate on the state of emergency. It
should declare the unconstitutionality of the state of emergency through resolutions
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and legislation, and assert its authority over the state in accordance with the 2008
Constitution. In addition, it should encourage civil servants and state institutions
to accept the authority of the Union Parliament and to reject the unconstitutional
authority of the Commander-in-Chief.
The strategy is to set up the Union Parliament as a competing source of authority
within Myanmar. It would serve as a focal point for political mobilization against the
structures established by the Commander-in-Chief, and a rallying point for the public
to call for the restoration of the constitutional order.
A civil disobedience movement initiated by doctors and nurses has gained massive
support among the general public, including civil servants and security officers.
The tide is turning. The international community must act decisively to support
democracy in Myanmar before the Tatmadaw strikes back with violent force – as it
did in 1988 and 2007.
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